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Abstract 
The place name and geo-coordinates of tweets are supposed to represent the possible location of the user 
at the time of posting that tweet. However, our analysis over a large collection of tweets indicates that 
these fields may not give the correct location of the user at the time of posting that tweet. Our 
investigation reveals that the tweets posted through third party applications such as Instagram or 
Swarmapp contain the geo-coordinate of the user specified location, not his current location. Any place 
name can be entered by a user to be displayed on a tweet. It may not be same as his/her exact location. 
Our analysis revealed that around 12% of tweets contains place names which are different from their real 
location. The findings of this research can be used as caution while designing location-based services 
using social media. 
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Introduction 
Twitter is an online social networking website, where a user can make his/her profile and interact with 
other users on the online platform. Users can update their views regarding an issue and can see the 
updates of others. Twitter is being extensively used in various emergency situations like earthquakes, fire, 
terrorist attacks, etc. (Landwehr et al., 2016; Laylavi et al., 2017; Laylavi et al., 2016; Sakaki et al., 2013). 
Nowadays, various government agencies use twitter for monitoring the traffic of public transport, 
providing a solution to a problem in real time etc. (Congosto et al., 2015). Several government agencies 
like Indian railway is using Twitter for proving the solution of various problems with their passengers. 
Various rescue and relief operations are being done by the government agencies in the situation of 
disaster by knowing information of the victims from twitter. So, the location information of the tweet is 
one of the most important parameters. The use of Twitter in various humanitarian applications 
(Landwehr et al., 2016; Laylavi et al., 2017; Laylavi et al., 2016; Sakaki et al., 2013) requires the location of 
the user to make the system really useful in terms of services. The research work on location estimation 
using social media is a need of the hour and several research works have been reporting on it in recent 
times (Graham et al., 2014, Laylavi et al. 2016, Minot et al., 2015, Schulz et al., 2013, Watanabe et al., 
2011). Twitter provides three options for sharing one’s location: (1) User location, (2) Place name, and (3) 
Geo-coordinate. User location is the field which is entered by the user at the time of creating their profile. 
This is user choice related field, so the user can write any word. Due to users’ choice, in many cases, they 
write meaningless words which may not refer to any location names. The analysis of (Cheng et al. 2010) 
found 26% of users have mentioned their location name at the city level or below city level. Hecht et al. 
(2011) found 34% users do not provide real location information in their profile. Another option provided 
by Twitter to report one’s location is to attach a city name (Place name, visible with tweet) to their tweets 
at the time of posting their tweet. Twitter also provides an option to attach geo-location at the time of 
posting a tweet using GPS (Global Positioning System) of users’ device. Most of the researchers (Huang et 
al., 2014; Nakaji and Yanai, 2012; Yuan et al., 2013) take geo-location as an authentic source of the 
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location at the time of tweeting. Cheng et al. (2010) found only 0.42% of tweets are geo-tagged whereas 
Morstatter et al. (2013) found 3.17% tweets are geo-tagged. In our case, this percentage rose to 7.90% (see 
Table 1). This number has increased due to the popularity of mobile devices and better Internet 
connectivity in recent years. A number of location-related research works are based on geo-location of 
users as the current location.   
While analyzing the different location fields of the tweets, we found that all location reporting fields can 
be manipulated making their authenticity questionable. In this research, we aimed at finding the 
percentage of tweets containing different location related fields. We also look into the genuineness of the 
location related fields present in tweets.  
We analyzed a total of 2493776 tweets and checked the availability of location field. The results are listed 
in Table. 1. For investigation of geo-location and place name authenticity, we first analyzed user 
movement with time to find suspicious users and then analyzed their tweets to get a result. We can see 
from Figure 3 and Figure 4, the user has mentioned a place name (inside the red box) with their tweets. 
Both of these tweets are posted from the same user account, but due to privacy concern, we can't show the 
name of the user. The timing of both the tweets is same but the distance between mentioned place names 
with tweet are very large (see Figure 1). It is not possible for a single person to go to both places 
individually for posting these tweets, i.e., this may be the case of a false place name or, the same account 
may be logged at different places by two different people. So we applied our methodology to investigate 
place name in tweets by calculating the distance between the current geo-location of users with the geo-
location of the centroid of that place name. If the distance is greater than the half of the length of the 
greatest diagonal of the place name (see Equation 4), then the mentioned place name is false. 
 
Figure 1. Geographical Distance between New Delhi to Tinsukia 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The works related to location extraction and location-
based services are described in Section 2.  Section 3 contains the methodology of the proposed work. The 
results are placed in Section 4. The finding of the research along with some limitations are placed in 
Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6 pointing to some further research. 
Literature Review 
Twitter provides many choices to users such as geo-tagging of tweets, location mentioning in a tweet etc. 
to inform about their locations to their friends’ circle and group members. The accurate location 
estimation at the real time plays a significant role in logistics, stockpiles, medical supply planning 
(Duhamel et al., 2016; Lei et al., 2015; Ozdamar et al., 2004; Paul et al., 2012). The study by Cheng et al. 
(2010) shows that only 26% users have mentioned their location name at the city level or below city level 
and rest of them provide their location at the country level or even some meaningless word. Hecht et al. 
(2011) performed a substantial research on users' profile locations. They found that 34% users do not 
provide real location information in his profile. They applied machine learning techniques to find user's 
country and state with decent accuracy. Minot et al. (2015) proposed a method for evaluation of the home 
location of users based on their content of posts and their social connections on Twitter. They achieved an 
accuracy of 77% within 10 km range. Schulz et al. (2013) detected the spatial indicators in the text of tweet 
as well as in the profile of users to find the created location of the tweet and the residence of users. Laylavi 
et al. (2016) proposed a multi-elemental location inference method to predict the location of tweets by 
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using the text of the tweet, users' profile location, and place labeling. This study reported that 87% tweets 
are successfully geo-located with mean distance error of 12.2 km and the median distance error of 4.5 km. 
Graham et al. (2014) undertook a comprehensive research on location information, which is available 
with tweets such as profile location, device location and time zone. Watanabe et al. (2011) proposed a 
system called real-time location detection system, which automatically geo-tags an event by identifying 
the location. Huang et al. (2014) proposed a GIS approach to infer created a location of tweets down to the 
zip code using geo-tags as spatial field and timestamps as a temporal field from tweets.  Yuan et al. (2013) 
proposed a probabilistic generative model to capture the users’ mobility behavior by considering the 
spatial, temporal and activity of users’ from tweets. Nakaji et al. (2012) proposed a method to select 
images related to events occurring at the real time and take geo-tag and visual feature of images from 
tweets to visualize the events in real-time. The authenticity of user location using place name and geo-
coordinate has not been explored earlier as there were very few tweets having geo-coordinates. However, 
due to increasing usages of Twitter on mobile devices, interest in geo-coordinates based location services 
is increasing nowadays.  
Methodology 
We have collected tweets from 8th Nov 2016 15th Jan 2017 using the streaming API of Twitter. We 
extracted the required information such as created at (time of posting a tweet), geo-location, place name 
and boundary box of the place name in the form of geo-coordinates. Total 2493776 tweets have been 
collected in which 7.90% of tweets are geo-tagged, 47.33% tweets have place name and 5.07% of tweets 
have both geo-tagging as well as place name associated with it, which is tabulated in Table 1.  
Tweets (Total) 2493776 Percentage 
Tweets (Geo-location) 196889 7.90% 
Tweets (Place name) 1180281 47.33% 
Tweets (Place Name & Geo-location ) 126389 5.07% 
Table 1. Description of Data Collected from Twitter API 
 
 
Geo-Location Authenticity 
The evaluation of geo-location authenticity is depicted in Figure 2 (left side block). Geo-tagged tweets 
contain information about the time of posting as well as its latitude and longitude. We have calculated the 
movement of a user with time by calculating the distance between its GPS location divided by the 
difference between the created times of both the tweets. Movement of a user is calculated by the 
mathematical equation given in equation 1. (Latitude, Longitude)1 and Tweet time1 represent the geo-
location and created time of the first tweet respectively, whereas (Latitude, Longitude)2 and Tweet time2 
represent the geo-location and created time of second tweets respectively. 
 
 
                                      			
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The distance between two GPS locations is calculated by the ‘haversine’ formula. This formula is used to 
calculate the great circle distance between two GPS points, i.e., the shortest distance over the earth’s 
surface. 
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Figure 2. The System Architecture for Finding Non-Relevant Activity 
Our system looks for the user whose movement with respect to time is greater than the value of a 
threshold (T1), then those users are considered as suspicious in nature, else it is a relevant activity. Here, 
we are considering a realistic scenario and putting the threshold as 1500 kilometres per hour as it is 
generally not possible to cover 1500 km in an hour for a person. So, we put a threshold T1 very high such 
that we are able to get only those users whose activities are suspicious in nature.  
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We found 291 users account whose movement is greater than 1500 km per hour, means suspicious in 
nature as decided by equation 3. Then we analyzed the tweets of these suspicious users and found 271 
users account in which tweets are posted from third party application like Instagram1, Swarmapp2 etc. and 
remaining 20 accounts have tweets related to advertisements. Instagram is a very popular service where a 
user can upload his/her images. It also provides the option to share the image with their social networks 
such as Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Flickr, etc. Swarmapp is used by the users to share their location on 
their social networks. The users of Instagram can upload their image with geo-location on their Instagram 
profile and then they can share this image on their social networks at any time.  
The 20 accounts using the Twitter official application may be logged in from a very distant place or it 
might have been hacked by someone or, more than one person is using the same account from very far 
places to do the advertisement for their company. After getting 271 user account where tweets are posted 
from third party application, one of the very genuine questions comes into existence, why these things 
happen when tweets posted from third party applications? To answer this question, we made a group of 
65 people and instruct them to use Instagram application and geo-tag their image and upload on their 
Instagram account. The people are instructed to move to some other place and share their image on 
Twitter from Instagram and post one other tweet from the official Twitter application with geo-tagging 
such that we are able to get the geolocation of both the tweets. When we get these tweets from the Twitter 
API, the location of both the tweets are different. The tweets shared from Instagram have the same 
location as at the time of uploading on Instagram whereas the tweet posted from Twitter official 
application contains the actual location of users. So tweets posted from third party applications are not 
authentic in terms of current geo-location of users. Some of the results of sample tweets are listed in Table 
3. 
Place Name Authenticity 
The steps to evaluate the authenticity of place name fields is shown in right side block in Figure 2.  Twitter 
provides an option for users to tag a neighborhood or city place name in his tweets. In our analysis, we 
found 47.33% of tweets are place labeled, which is tabulated in Table 1. The Figure 3 and 4 shows place 
labeled tweets in which we can see, the place name in both the tweets are different, in fact, the distance 
between the locations of both tweets is very large but the timing of both the tweets is same. So this is the 
clear case that the user tagged wrong place name in his/her tweet or, it is multi-logged in from very 
distant places or, it comes from third party applications. So for doing an analysis of these, we took tweets 
which have both geo-tagging as well as a place name. Some of the tweets have a country level place name 
(like, India, China, etc.), those types of tweets are removed from our dataset and we have done an analysis 
of tweets which have tagged up to the city level. Place name labeled tweets have the boundary box of that 
place in the form of geo-coordinates. Although, the Twitter user can tag false place name along with his 
tweets, but at the back end, when we extract the tweet from Twitter API it gives the original geo-location 
of that user if he/she has also geo-tagged his tweets. We have calculated the centroid of the polygon (Place 
name boundary box) and calculated the distance between the centroid and the current geo-location of the 
user. We put a threshold (see Equation 4), which decides the place name tagged by the user with his tweet 
is either false or true. We found 12% of the total tweets are false place labeled. The result is discussed in 
Section 4. 
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1 https://www.instagram.com  
2 https://www.swarmapp.com 
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Figure 3. Tweet of a User at Location: 1 
 
 
Figure 4. Tweet of a User at Location: 2 
 
Results 
The results of our analysis are discussed in this section. The availability of geo-location and place names 
are 7.90% and 47.33% respectively, whereas tweets with both geo-location as well as a place name are 
5.07% as shown in Table 1.  
We have done the analysis of all the geo-tagged tweets and find the movement of a user with time. We put 
a threshold T1 equal to 1500 km per hour and find the suspicious movement of users. We analyzed 
suspicious user accounts whose results are given in Table 2, where a total of 291 users has the suspicious 
movement. We found 93% users have tweets from third party applications.  
 
Type Number of Accounts Percentage (approx.) 
Tweets (Third Party 
Application) 
271 93% 
Multiple Logged In or, Hacked 
by Someone or, etc. 
20 7% 
Total 291 100% 
Table 2. Information about the Suspicious Users Tweets 
 
Our result is shown in Table 3 which shows the geo-location of tweets posted from third party application 
are not authentic in terms of the current location of users. The remaining 7% tweets are related to the 
advertisement, it can be hacked by someone or, multiple logged in from very distant place to do the 
advertisements of their companies. We can see from the Table 3 the geo-location extracted from Twitter 
API have the different geo-location for tweets posted from Instagram and from the Twitter official 
application, even the timing of tweeting is same in both the case. Each of the images posted from 
Instagram is represented by Image ID. The latitude and longitude information of tweets posted from 
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Instagram is given in column “Twitter API (Lat, Long)” and the current latitude and longitude 
information is given in column “Current (Lat, Long)”. 
 
Image ID Twitter API (Lat, Long) Current (Lat, Long) 
Image ID1 (23.74862195, 90.4267931) (27.0667, 89.5833) 
Image ID2 (43.05681936, 141.41050296) (35.00950186, 138.38542431) 
Image ID3 (35.16876448, 136.91358155) (35.0039225, 135.77481174) 
Image ID4 (35.1972, 102.51) (39.3914, 76.04) 
Image ID5 (10.79252589, 71.16183139) (15.09830436, 98.07658833) 
Image ID6 (33.04852415, 103.93067198) (30.73819919, 104.1402125) 
Image ID7 (39.2716, 141.881) (38.2603, 140.883) 
Image ID8 (26.92286, 80.94708) (22.76110526, 79.57745502) 
Table 3. Geo-location Comparison of Sample Images Posted from 
Instagram with current Geo-location 
  
We took only tweets posted from Twitter for Android official application for the authentic geo-location. 
We found a total of 56,892 tweets that posted from a Twitter official application and have both geo-
tagging as well as place labeling. Our system is able to find approximately 12% of total tweets with false 
place labeling (see Table 4).  
 
Tweets (Twitter for Android) False Place Name Percentage (approx.) 
56892 6827 12% 
Table 4. Description about the False Place Name in Tweets 
Some of the sample tweets, which have false place labeling are shown in Table 5. Each Tweet is 
represented by Tweet ID. Place name and corresponding geo-location of each tweet are written in column 
“Place Name” and “Real Geo-location” respectively.  We can see that the real location of users is different 
from the place name. 
Tweet ID Place Name Real Geo-location 
Tweet ID1 New Delhi, India Assam, India (27.494830, 95.355684) 
Tweet ID2 Patna, Bihar Uttar Pradesh (28.584872, 78.538366) 
Tweet ID3 Kanpur, India Punjab (30.067238, 75.654309) 
Tweet ID4 Dadar, Mumbai Powai, India (19.119544, 72.910541) 
Tweet ID5 IIT, Delhi Ajmer, India (19.119544, 72.910541) 
Table 5. Some of Sample False Name Tagged in Tweets  
Discussion 
The major contribution of the current research is finding Twitter accounts who are posting more than one 
tweet at the same time (within seconds) from different locations separated by more than 1500 km. The 
detailed analysis of those tweets revealed that around 93% of those cases are posted from third party 
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applications such as Instagram, Swarmapp etc. The remaining 7% were related to advertisements. Further 
analysis of tweets posted from Instagram shows a different location than the current location of the user. 
The major implications of this finding are that even geo-locations attached with a tweet may not be taken 
as an authentic source of user location at that time. The other facility of putting place names in a tweet is 
also misused by a number of users as shown by our analysis (see Table 4). People can give any place name 
in a tweet, which will appear on the tweet. The major implication of this finding is that even place name 
cannot be taken as an authentic location information for location-based services. In various research 
(Huang et al., 2014; Nakaji and Yanai, 2012; Yuan et al., 2013) geo-location of users are used as the 
authentic location, but the finding of this current research does not support that. Some of the government 
agencies like Indian Railway are using the location of passengers from twitter to provide the solution to 
their problem. A number of images related to a disaster are posted by the users of third party applications 
to their Twitter accounts. A number of other studies (Chen et al., 2014; Congosto et al., 2015; Kavanaugh 
et al., 2012) used Twitter for monitoring road traffic by tracking users’ tweets, messages using either geo-
location or place name as location fields. All of these systems need to take extra care of geo-location if 
tweets are coming from third party applications. This study can also be useful to make people aware to 
ensure their geo-locations in the situation of any disaster, crime, etc.. The current finding helps research 
community and practitioners involved in location based services in social media to make a proper 
preprocessing of tweets and filter out tweets posted by third party application to get the accurate location 
of users. 
Conclusion 
We analyzed the various parameters of location information in tweets such as place names and geo-
location for their authenticity of providing correct information. We found from our analysis that neither 
place name nor geo-location gives 100% authentic location information of a user at the time of tweeting. 
Both place names and geo-location can be tweaked to give false information regarding the location of the 
user. Most of the time, the geo-location of tweets coming from third party applications such as Instagram, 
Swarmapp etc. gives wrong location information about the user. Our findings prove that the tweets posted 
from third party applications are not authentic in terms of current geo-location of users. We also 
investigated the authenticity of the place name in tweets and found 12% of tweets are false place labeled. 
One of the major limitation of our study is that our system is exclusively valid for tweets having both place 
name and geo-location. But most of the users do not put their geo-location on in their tweets so indicating 
a false place name is not possible with our system. The current research can be further extended by 
including more third party applications to check the authenticity of the location information. The current 
research can be supplemented by predicting real-location of user using other fields of tweets such as tweet 
text, historical location etc.  
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